PhD Candidate


Secret but Constrained: The Impact of Elite Opposition on Covert Operations (International Organization)

Recent international relations scholarship has argued that political elites constrain the use of military force by democracies. Despite the persuasiveness of this research, scholars have largely ignored the ability of elite dynamics to constrain the initiation of covert operations. This omission is consequential because scholars of U.S. foreign policy often assume that covert operations serve as a substitute for the overt use of force; secrecy allows leaders to limit information to congressional elites and thus weaken their oversight capabilities. Do elite political dynamics constrain the ability of presidents to act secretly or do they only affect the overt use of force? I argue that elite political constraints—particularly opposition from Congress—extend to the president’s ability to initiate covert operations. By examining the trade-off between U.S. military force and CIA initiated covert operations during the Cold War, I find the likelihood that covert operations are initiated decreases significantly during periods of divided government and that there is no distinguishable trade-off between covert operations and overt military force. Furthermore, the results suggest that constraints on covert operations became more uniform across unified and divided government following congressional oversight reforms in 1975 that reduced the information asymmetry between the majority and minority party. Finally, this paper has important ramifications for the nascent literature on back-door bargaining and covert signalling. Because democratic leaders frequently face domestic political costs even when acting in secret, covert operations should allow leaders to credibly convey their resolve.

Manuscript and Supplementary Materials


Power Today is Not Power Tomorrow: Adaptation and the Declining Effectiveness of Coercion

At its core, strategy is the study of interdependent decisions. An optimal strategy must account for an opponent’s set of moves and countermoves. Despite this basic insight, existing theories examine coercion almost entirely from the perspective of the initiating state. This approach ignores the fact that coercion creates inherent pressure for the target to adapt in ways that reduce the effectiveness of an imposed policy. I develop a theory of strategic adaptation that identifies the conditions under which the effects of policies will increase, decrease, or remain constant over time. The most salient implication of this theory is that power today does not imply power tomorrow even when material capabilities remain constant. Because actors are continuously adapting, policies that are effective at coercing an opponent today are likely to become ineffective or even counterproductive in the future.

The Dynamic Effect of Bombing in Vietnam

More to come soon!

Map of Combat Sorties (1965 - 1973)

Map of Combat Sorties (1965 - 1973)

Operation Rolling Thunder

Operation Rolling Thunder